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Terminology first1 
Legal work is linguistic work; legal problems are therefore more often than not 
terminological in nature. This is true not only for the detailed norms and pro-
visions of criminal law, tax law or civil law, but for public law too. Among the 
various sources and forms of public law – federal, state and local, constitution, 
statutes and ordinances – constitutional law naturally reigns supreme. Its su-
preme nature does not protect the constitution from terminological ambiva-
lence though, in fact, the opposite is true. In order to perform its functions as 
the paramount law of the land, the constitution necessarily ought to strive for a 
certain amount of linguistic flexibility and vagueness. Of course, this leaves 
any analysis or application of constitutional law with the somewhat ominous 
task of interpreting and inferencing the actual wording of constitutional provi-
sions. Among the many ambivalences of constitutional vagueness is what in 
Anglo-American constitutional thought is referred to as the “rule of law”. 
Although rich in philosophical, historical and legal overtones, pinpointing its 
                                                     
1 This contribution remains in the form of my original lecture. I therefore make scarce 
use of references, mostly where they serve to verify quotations. Important input 
stems from the works of the German scholar Eberhard Schmidt-Aßmann on consti-
tutional and particularly administrative law. Arguments drawing upon democratic 
and constitutional theory are inspired by works of the German constitutional scholar 
Martin Morlok. 
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essence is challenging. The same is true for the German term Rechtsstaat  
(Art. 20 § 1, 28 § 1 of the German constitution (GG), which – in a literal 
translation – reads “state of law”. It has literal siblings in French (État de 
droit) and Italian (stato di diritto) that basically lean on the legal tradition of 
the German term, that in essence stems from 19th century constitutional 
thought.2 Among many others, Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm von Humboldt 
contributed ground-breaking philosophical thoughts, Lorenz von Stein and 
Robert von Mohl contributed legal explications of the concept. How to distin-
guish the Anglo-American concept of rule of law from the continental tradi-
tion of Rechtsstaat is, in the words of Gustavo Gozzi, “una disputa senza fine”.3  
In this contribution, I will therefore not focus on that particular debate 
with its at times rather subtle differentiations. Instead I would like to address 
some broader aspects of the matter, therein applying a more generalized con-
cept of Rechtsstaat. It aims at outlining some fundamental aspects, some of 
which I think are overlooked in their significance for a political system that 
aims to be constitutional and “lawful” in nature. Therefore I will somewhat 
arbitrarily use Rechtsstaat and rule of law synonymously.  
Key Aspects of Rule of Law and Rechtsstaat  
Both concepts obviously showcase “law” as the central aspect of the political 
and maybe even the social system they are applied to. Law in both concepts 
serves different purposes. It serves as binding mechanism for any yielding of 
public authority. In this sense law constitutes and apportions competencies 
and capacities to public institutions and organizations. For example: Lately, 
disputes on what intelligence agencies may or may not do nationally or inter-
nationally have been on the agenda in the United States, Great Britain, Ger-
many and France. May the American National Security Agency (NSA) spy on 
government officials of allied states (or do they even reciprocate?). Obviously, 
the constitutional super-subject of separation of powers heavily relies on legal 
provisions either of constitutional or statutory nature.  
                                                     
2 See Alemann in this volume. 
3 Gozzi (2003), 260. 
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But of course, there is more to law. At the same time it serves as a means of 
orientation for public action of any nature. This is particularly true for consti-
tutional provisions that influence the application of statutory law, be it public 
or private. In this context, fundamental rights and freedoms are of utmost 
importance because not only do they guide and limit the legislative branch, 
but the executive and judicial branch as well. 
Both rule of law and Rechtsstaat in their traditional sense come with a 
twist that on a terminological level is all but obvious. “Law” in both contexts 
claims a somewhat exclusive position. Not only does it bind public authority 
by forbidding any arbitrariness in yielding its power. It also limits ideological 
usurpation of the law, be it of religious, political or other nature. It therefore 
does not come as a surprise that for example the former socialist German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR) strongly kept its constitutional scholars from drawing 
upon the bourgeois concept of Rechtsstaat. Instead, they came up with what 
became known as “sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit” (socialist lawfulness).4 Public 
authority was not only to abide by the laws but also by the will of the party 
and its officials. Deviating from the law and its basic values in order to fulfil 
political requirements was expected of everyone applying the law. 
In the Neighborhood: Constitutional Affinities of the Rule of Law 
The anti-ideological bias of the traditional concepts of rule of law and 
Rechtsstaat of course reveal their own ideological roots. They are, as constitu-
tional concepts, not neutral in the sense that they can be used to describe any 
system that runs along the lines of written legal provisions. Instead, they are 
constitutional concepts of liberal political systems which dominate the western 
hemisphere. At the core of those systems lies an unwavering, almost radical 
belief in the individual and his freedoms, in his prerogative of choice how to 
conduct his life, how sociable or introvert his acts, which beliefs are held and 
which purpose of life is chosen. We find that idea enshrined in various consti-
tutional and quasi-constitutional provisions, among them the American Decla-
ration of Independence and the German constitution. The American Declara-
tion of Independence dates from 1776 and famously declares: “We hold these 
                                                     
4 Mollnau (1999), 59 ff.; Stolleis (2009).  
130 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness”. In a simpler, more legalistic way, Art. 1 
§ 1 GG prescribes:  
“Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar. Sie zu achten und zu schützen ist Ver-
pflichtung aller staatlichen Gewalt (Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority).” 
Western constitutionalism therefore puts emphasis on the constitutional rank 
of human rights. Interpretation of human rights-provisions is a chief concern 
of constitutional scholarship and constitutional practice alike. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that public debates of Rechtsstaat and rule of law often con-
centrate on human rights, their legal guarantees and their efficacy in day-to-
day state practice. And of course, human rights are at the core of any political 
system that considers itself a Rechtsstaat. The individualistic approach is often 
related to the constitutional concept of democracy, basically claiming that 
violations of human rights are in essence undemocratic. The conceptual back-
ground of the assumption is rather exacting and is rarely made explicit in pub-
lic debates. It basically relies on the philosophical concept of constitutional 
contractualism according to which the guarantee and efficacy of human rights 
are a prerequisite of one’s entering into the social contract. Whereas this as-
sumption is equally true for any form of government that draws upon the con-
tractual motive, it is particularly important to a democracy. It serves to pre-
vent – as John Stuart Mill in his reflections “On Liberty” put it – a “tyranny of 
the majority”. That is to say, that any true democratic form of government 
needs to put in effect a working means of protecting the individual’s freedoms 
or it cannot be called democratic.5 
It becomes clear that democracy and the rule of law are intimately inter-
twined in terms of the guarantee of human rights. Yet, their specific perspec-
tives differ. The significance of human rights in respect to the democratic idea 
is of a more institutional nature whereas the perspective of rule of law is more 
of an individual nature, focusing on the actual efficacy of human rights-
guarantees. To put it differently: Whereas the democratic approach asks if 
human rights are guaranteed, the Rechtsstaat-approach asks how they are 
guaranteed. This brings us back to the fundamental assumptions of the rule of 
                                                     
5 Morlok/Michael (2015), 136. 
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law and to its conceptual presuppositions. From German constitutional schol-
arship stems the distinction of two dimensions of a Rechtsstaat, one being 
more formal and the other being more substantive or – in German – “materi-
ell” (the term “materiell” refers to the content, the essence, the subject matter 
of a norm, to what the rule is about). 
In it is reflected a development of legal thought that occurred between the 
19th and 20th century: The dominating perspective of legal thought in the 19th 
and the early 20th century was legal positivism. Positivism did not very much 
care about the objectives of a legal system, of what the law was used to achieve. 
In positivistic thinking, law was legitimate as long as it originated from the 
power constitutionally authorized to make law (i.e. the monarch or parlia-
ment). All public authority, namely the executive and the judicial branch, had 
to do was to enact the will of the legislator. This of course raises the question 
of how to provide for means and measures for those branches to effectively 
enact the legislative program. Given the case of Germany, the experience of the 
formally legal Nazi Dictatorship, but also other historical events of the 20th 
century led to a decline in positivistic thinking. Substantive perspectives 
gained ground – and for good reasons. The international scope and depth of 
the human rights-debates is only comprehensible against the back-drop of the 
historic experiences of the 20th century.  
Yet, along with the popularity of more substantive views goes an undenia-
ble neglect of the more formal aspects of the rule of law, which are particularly 
interesting for countries in transition to a system of rule of law. So, what needs 
to be kept in mind is that running a state by the rule of law has to distinguish 
between the outcome of public decision making (i.e. in the form of laws, exec-
utive orders or judicial decisions) and the way the decision was made. Whereas 
the outcome-perspective raises substantive questions i.e. on how individual 
rights are affected, the formal perspective focuses on aspects of the decision 
making. Now, what are those formal aspects? 
Dull but Decisive? Organization and Procedure  
Three Aspects to Consider 
When concentrating on the more formal aspects of a Rechtsstaat, three aspects 
come into sight, in descending levels of abstraction: questions of legitimacy of 
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law (as dealt with above regarding positivism), the distinction between consti-
tutional and statutory law and the means of organization and procedure. 
The positivist approach basically provides a scheme of legal legitimacy: Not 
what the law is about matters, but whether or not it was given by the legiti-
mate body. And although we have since come further in our idea of legal legit-
imacy, the initial idea of positivism is of course still correct. Therefore, what 
can be said today is that law is legitimate as far as it originates from a constitu-
tionally authorized legislator (often, though by far not exclusively, parliament) 
and stays within the constitutional limits (mostly, but not exclusively human 
rights as granted by the constitution in question).  
This scheme works well as long as we operate on the basis of a highly sim-
plistic understanding of what law is. When we perceive laws as rules void of 
linguistic ambivalence and discretionary elements, we need not worry about 
their proper application. Yet, any law is full of both, voluntarily and involun-
tarily. This makes the application of law a treacherous business, full of possi-
bilities to undermine the will of the legislator (or the will of the law itself, 
depending on one’s methodological perspective) or even consciously deviating 
from it. This affects a fundamental objective of law in general that lies within 
the idea of law’s generality: Equality of application. Law as we understand it is 
only legitimate if its application fulfils standards of equality. The law itself 
must provide that those standards are met. 
Another aspect needs to be considered: Simply put, we like public action to 
be right. That is to say that we expect a certain level of rationality in whatever 
the state decides to do. The sources of rationality are twofold: They comprise 
the law itself as the normative standard of rationality; the law says what’s right 
and what’s not. Yet, the law’s normative claim is not independent, it does not 
exist in itself, but naturally relates and relies on certain facts, which have to be 
considered, which are sometimes contested and ultimately need to be proven 
by the parties involved, be they private or public.  
All this shifts the general focus away from the provisions of the constitution 
because its provisions conventionally do not deal with details of public power-
yielding. Instead, what comes into sight are statutory rules made by parlia-
ment as the key legislator. Those statutory rules of course have to address an 
abundance of different forms and contexts in which public power is yielded. 
They have to address both administrative as well as judicial action. They need 
to be adequate in the sense that they need to meet the above mentioned stand-
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ards. At the same time, they need to provide for a sufficient level of effective-
ness of public actions. Of course, our desire is to achieve just and factually 
adequate decisions, but in due time and form.  
Altogether, questions arise as to how to organize public authority and how 
to equip public authority with procedures and forms of public action that pro-
vide for the meeting of those standards. This, of course, is a highly demanding 
task to complete and confronts any legislator with challenges that might seem 
insurmountable. Given the example of Germany, legal scholarship and legal 
practice have worked decades to develop a somewhat coherent system of rules 
of organization and procedure. And yet, debates on how to reform and develop 
namely administrative law have been on the agenda for over twenty years now. 
European unification puts additional pressure on the structures and institu-
tions developed. I will for reasons of efficiency concentrate on aspects of execu-
tive administrative law. 
Specialization as an Organizational Principle 
A key aspect of public authority in a Rechtsstaat is the fashion in which it is 
organized. Organization in this sense pertains to executive structures along the 
lines of specialization and hierarchy. If rationality is a desirable aspect of public 
decision making, specialization obviously serves this purpose: By limiting an 
agency’s competencies to certain areas of the law (for example education, wel-
fare, and public safety) public officials can develop expertise not only in respect 
to the laws to be applied, but a factual expertise, too. The importance of a 
proper assessment of facts can hardly be overestimated in the application of any 
law. Experienced judges or agency officials often can assess the legal gravitas of 
a case based on the way and which facts are presented by the parties.  
In addition, specialization in the sense of exclusive administrative compe-
tencies furthers the cause of separation of powers within the executive branch 
of government because it limits the access of public officials to a closely de-
fined area of the law. At the same time, expertise not only heightens the stand-
ards of rationality, but also serves the purpose of equal application of the law, 
because a smaller number of people deal with certain fields of law. Sub-legal 
standards and guidelines of interpretation and application of legal provisions 
can develop, practically “legalizing” informal expertise gathered by public 
officials in a certain field of law.  
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Hierarchy and Oversight as Organizational Principles 
Another important feature of organizing public authority is different hierar-
chic levels. In Germany, administrative structure on the level of the federal 
states usually is threefold. Many of the executive branch’s tasks are fulfilled on 
the local level or the “county”-level (the so called Kreise). The highest level is 
usually a minister (secretary) of the state government. The intermediary level, 
mostly called Bezirksregierungen (which loosely translates to district govern-
ment) mostly serves as a secondary administrative level, in some cases though 
as the primary administrative agency. 
Closely tied to the idea of hierarchic organizational patterns are of course 
mechanisms of review and supervision/oversight. Seemingly similar, the differ-
ence is that review is instigated by the private individual raising objections for 
example against a license permitting the erection and operation of an industri-
al plant (so called Widerspruchsverfahren). Although measures of administra-
tive review have in recent years been abolished in some German federal states 
in favor of immediate judicial review, administrative review remains a vital 
part of the German administrative system. Supervision/oversight (Aufsicht), in 
contrast, is not (formally) initiated by the private individual, but by the supe-
rior administrative level.6 German administrative law differentiates two forms 
of supervision, depending on different levels of intensity. Legal supervision 
(Rechtsaufsicht) is limited to merely rebuke violations of the law but needs to 
refrain from rebuking aspects of expediency of an administrative decision. In 
contrast, the so called Fachaufsicht (technical supervision) is free to act also 
upon its own ideas of expediency.  
Independent Agencies 
Exceptions to the rule of review and supervision are independent agencies that 
do not answer to a superior administrative level. The German national bank 
(Bundesbank) is an example of a (constitutionally) independent body (Art. 88 
GG). The same is true for the European Central Bank. Two motives for inde-
pendent administrative bodies, lately advanced by European Union law,7 arise. 
The more prone administrative functions are to political interference, the more 
important are mechanisms securing the administrative process. Secondly, the 
                                                     
6 Kahl (2000); Pieper (2006).  
7 Kröger/Pilniok (2016).  
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closer an administrative body serves the usage and expression of fundamental 
freedoms, the more independent its actions need to be (such as: broadcasting 
institutions, data protection agencies). Yet, independent agencies need to be 
the exception to the rule of effective administrative supervision. Not only do 
they raise questions in terms of the rule of law, but the democratic legitimacy 
of independent agencies is at stake, too.8 
Rules of Procedure 
Organizational aspects aside, rules of procedure play a prominent part safe-
guarding administrative decision making. “Rules of procedure” in this context 
serve as an umbrella-term. It includes all rules pertaining to administrative 
procedure in particular, to the parties involved and to administrative forms of 
action. 
Legitimacy by Procedure 
Rules of procedure are of utmost importance to any administrative system 
under the rule of law. Procedural provisions mainly serve to produce legitima-
cy of administrative decisions.9 Often, administrative law does not determine 
legal consequences in detail but instead establishes discretionary decisions to 
be made by the respective administrative body. This results in legal uncertain-
ty. Given the situation of several options available, procedural measures (for 
example of inclusion of parties affected by the decision) help to raise acceptance 
of a decision even if the outcome is not favorable for the affected party. Proce-
dure therefore serves to change a situation of uncertainty into a situation of 
acceptable certainty.  
Types and Objectives of Procedural Rules 
Administrative procedures are structured and measured actions to obtain and 
process information.10 Depending on the scope and the impact of the respective 
administrative decision (for example: licensing an industrial plant vs. issuing a 
driver’s license), the preceding procedure needs to be adjusted accordingly: 
Whereas issuing a driver’s license usually depends on fairly simple and easy-to-
                                                     
8 Hoffmann-Riem (2010).  
9 Luhmann (2005).  
10 Schmidt-Aßmann (2006), 305. 
136 
prove prerequisites, licensing an industrial plant is by far more complex. This 
of course must lead to more complex procedures involving various stakeholders 
and the interests they represent. Also, the complexity of matters regulated rises 
and shapes the decision to be made. 
Generally speaking, different types of administrative procedures can be dis-
tinguished:11  
- Procedures serving purposes of (quasi-judicial) review of administrative 
decisions (supervision/oversight). 
- Procedures enabling administrative decision-making in individual cases 
(any form of licensing private actions, granting subsidies or ordering an in-
dividual to fulfil certain legal duties, for example). 
- Procedures of a more complex nature, spatial planning for example. Namely 
the latter pose taxing objectives because usually complex nettings of differ-
ent interests need to be examined and evaluated. Not only does that require 
comprehensive obtaining of information but also normative standards on 
how to process the information. Therefore, representation of interest, evalu-
ation of interests and due processing of interests are the core objectives of 
any administrative procedure. 
Depending on the complexity of the matter at hand, procedural provisions can 
be more or less strict, granting or restricting the administration’s leeway in 
determining the necessary steps to be taken. Generally speaking, a high degree 
of formality is to be attained with any significant increase in the number of 
persons involved, the number and rank of legally protected interests and, gen-
erally speaking, the more complex the subject matter is. Complicated matters, 
for example, ask for mandatory hearings, documentation and probably publica-
tion of assertions made, deadlines for participatory actions need to be set and 
administrative decision-making needs to be coordinated with measures of judi-
cial review. Of course, procedure is not a means in itself but serves to enable 
binding administrative decisions; procedure has therefore to be related to spe-
cific forms of administrative action (Handlungsformen).  
Forms of Action 
Each branch of government acts in particular forms. The legislative branch 
passes laws, the judicial branch hands down verdicts (procedural actions such 
                                                     
11 Schmidt-Aßmann (2006), 148 ff. 
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as subpoenas or interlocutory judgements aside). The executive branch is pre-
occupied with applying the law in numerous fields. The executive licenses 
businesses, it issues driver’s licenses, it sets up development plans for cities, 
counties or entire countries, it supervises schools and universities, and it runs 
museums and public transportation and engages in other businesses. It takes 
action in individual cases (driver’s license, licensing a business) as well as regu-
lating a plurality of cases, for example in passing ordinances. Those forms of 
actions the executive branch takes differ in scope and impact.  
It is a key objective of administrative law to supply the executive branch 
with adequate forms of action. Not only to fulfil the executive’s tasks, but to 
secure that any form of action recognizes and respects different legal interests 
involved. Administrative forms of action are therefore inextricably linked to 
procedural law; they form the decisive part of the administrative process. Ad-
ministrative law-making therefore needs to identify typical administrative 
decisions, frame them legally and set up a procedural framework they are 
linked with. Legally framing procedure and forms of action serves the purpose 
of rationalizing administrative action. If recurring decisions take the same 
form and are reached by same or similar procedural actions, they enable the 
administrative bodies to find solutions to the problems at hand. At the same 
time, they become easier to control, either by means of supervision or judicial 
review.  
Rules and Procedure in Transitioning Countries 
As could be seen, rules of organization and procedure are a worthwhile topic of 
any state following the idea of rule of law. Rules of organization and procedure 
serve very important purposes not only in terms of legitimacy and rationality 
of public action, but also in terms of its efficiency. For countries transitioning 
to the rule of law, rules of organization and procedure are essential and – from 
a political point of view – the foremost task to concentrate on. 
Conclusion 
Although the rationale of legitimacy by procedure is not entirely free of ideo-
logical overtones, it comes relatively free of the highly individualistic ideals 
the western concept of human rights abides by. Rules of organization and pro-
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cedure aim at rational public decision making under complex circumstances, 
they are chiefly instrumental to the aims and objectives of substantive law 
(materielles Recht). At the same time, they are essential to any system of law 
that aims to fight despotism and arbitrariness in day-to-day legal work. There-
fore, calling for a systematic development of rational procedures is – within 
reason – compatible with different ideological outlooks on law and its func-
tions. Rules of organization and procedure can help to improve public decision 
making, largely, though not entirely independent of the contents of those deci-
sions. Besides, the logics of modern bureaucratic states might not differ that 
much on the local, hands-on level, even if the ideological presumptions of the 
political system at large are different: Acceptability, reasonability and finally 
feasibility of administrative decision making are wished for anywhere in the 
world. At the same time, fighting for a broad guarantee of classical human 
rights serves little to no purpose if the administrative (and judicial!) structures 
to effectively implement those rights are not in place.  
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